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I INTRODUCTION
Since its conception, the idea of constitutional property protection and
regulation in South Africa has been an academically captivating issue.1 At
ﬁrst, politicians negotiated whether the Constitution should protect vested
private property interests and contribute to the goals of political reform, and
how such a compromise could be achieved.2 Simultaneously, academics
ﬂexed their comparativist muscles, contemplating which of the prominent
models of constitutional property protection encountered worldwide would
lend itself best to adaptation for SouthAfrica.3 The main contenders were the
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1 Representative of the earliest contributions are: Carole Lewis ‘The right to
private property in a new political dispensation in SouthAfrica’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 389;
André van der Walt ‘Comparative notes on the constitutional protection of property
rights’ (1993) 19 Recht & Kritiek 263; Shadrack Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995).
2 More detail may be found in Hanri Mostert ‘SouthAfrican constitutional prop-
erty protection between libertarianism and liberationism: challenges for the judiciary’
(2000) 60 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 295.
3 See egAndré van der Walt ‘Notes on the interpretation of the property clause in
the new constitution’ (1994) 57 THRHR 181; John Murphy ‘Interpreting the prop-
erty clause in the constitution’ (1995) 10 SA Public Law 107; Duard Kleyn ‘The
constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and the
South African approach’ (1996) 11 SA Public Law 402; Andra Eisenberg ‘ ‘‘Public
purpose’’ and expropriation: Some comparative insights and the South African bill of
rights’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 207; André van der Walt ‘ ‘‘Double’’ property guarantees: a
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Anglo-American and German models of constitutional property protection,
although studies of many other jurisdictions were also undertaken.4
Eventually, the negotiators came up with s 25 of the 1996 Constitution. It
regulates the extent to which the state can justiﬁably place restrictions on
private property, and the circumstances under which compensation can be
claimed for such restrictions. These are the kinds of provisions one ﬁnds in
many jurisdictions boasting constitutional entrenchment of private property
rights, and/or constitutionally imposed standards for the limitation of
property rights. But the South African property clause goes further. It
provides a blueprint for reforming existing patterns of control over land. It
contains a commitment to the objectives of access to land, provision of
legally secure land tenure, land restitution and related reforms. Accordingly,
the South African property clause is characterised by an inherent tension
between its dichotomously protective and reformative aspects.5
The characteristically comparative academic discourse, which arose from
the enactment of the property clauses in the Interim Constitution and later
the 1996 Constitution, eventually turned inward. Studies became more
concerned with the unique nature of the South African property clause and
the very speciﬁc contexts in which it had to be applied, although they
generally remained mindful of the bigger comparative picture.6 Most of the
structural and comparative analysis’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 560; André van der Walt
‘Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of consti-
tutional practice relating to regulatory takings’ (1999) SA Public Law 273; André van
der Walt ‘Moving towards recognition of constructive expropriation’ (2002) 65
THRHR 459. This list is not comprehensive.
4 Most notably in André van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses — A Com-
parative Analysis (1999). See also John Murphy ‘Insulating land reform from constitu-
tional impugnment:An Indian case study’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 362.
5 André van derWalt Constitutional Property Law (2005) 17.
6 Representative are: André van der Walt ‘Exclusivity of ownership, security of
tenure and eviction orders: A critical evaluation of recent case law’ (2002) 18 SAJHR
254 and 372; André van der Walt ‘Negating Grotius — the constitutional validity of
statutory security rights in favour of the state: First National Bank of SA t/a Wesbank v
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2001 (7) BCLR 715 (C)’ (2002) 18
SAJHR 86; André van der Walt ‘Property rights v religious rights: Bührmann v
Nkosi’ (2002) 13 Stellenbosch LR 394; Theunis Roux (updated by Dennis Davis)
‘Property’ in Halton Cheadle, Dennis Davis & Nicholas Haysom South African Consti-
tutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (Service 5, 2007); Kevin Hopkins & Kate Hofmeyr
‘New perspectives on property’ (2003) 120 SALJ 48; Theunis Roux ‘Property’ in
Stuart Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed vol 3 (2003); André
van der Walt ‘Striving for the better interpretation — A critical reﬂection on the
Constitutional Court’s Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause’ (2004) 121
SALJ 854; André van der Walt ‘Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already?
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipal-
ity; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng
(CC)’ (2005) 122 SALJ 75; André van der Walt ‘The state’s duty to protect property
owners vs the state’s duty to provide housing: Thoughts on the Modderklip case’
(2005) 21 SAJHR 144; André van der Walt ‘Ownership and eviction: Constitutional
rights in private law’ (2005) 9 Edinburgh LR 32; André van der Walt ‘The state’s duty
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studies undertaken indicated that the political compromise embodied in the
property guarantee, alongside the many comparative inﬂuences that shaped
its character, caused some uncertainty as to the exact meaning and content of
the property clause. Everyone eagerly awaited an authoritative judicial
pronouncement on constitutional property protection and regulation. Some
years passed,7 however, before the SouthAfrican judiciary had an appropriate
opportunity in 2002 to test the provisions of the property clause.8
to pay ‘‘just and equitable’’ compensation for expropriation: Reﬂections on the Du
Toit case’ (2005) 122 SALJ 765; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op cit note 5;
Juanita Pienaar & Hanri Mostert ‘Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet:
Die verhouding tussen artikel 25(1), artikel 26(3) en die uitsettingswet’ 2006 TSAR
277 and 522;André van der Walt ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the develop-
ment of South African property law’ 2005 TSAR 655 and 2006 TSAR 1; Warren
Freedman ‘The constitutional right not to be deprived of property: the Constitu-
tional Court keeps its options open’ 2006 TSAR 83; André van der Walt ‘Reconcil-
ing the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’
compensation for expropriation’ (2006) 123 SALJ 23. This list is not comprehensive.
7 There was cursory consideration of the forerunner of the current property
clause, ie s 28 of the 1993 (Interim) Constitution, in Transkei Public Servants’Associa-
tion v Government of the Republic of South Africa & others 1995 (9) BCLR 1235 (Tk) and
Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land Affairs & another 1996 (12) BCLR 1573
(CC). More substantial discussion of s 28 in Harksen v Lane NO 1997 (11) BCLR
1489 (CC), which dealt with the distinction between deprivations and expropriations
(seeAndré van der Walt & Henk Botha ‘Coming to grips with the new constitutional
order: Critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO’ (1998) 13 SA Public Law 17). In the
First Certification Case (In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996) 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) the Constitutional Court dismissed objections
against the validity of s 25 of the 1996 Constitution along the lines that it did not
make explicit provision for a right to acquire, hold and dispose of property; that the
provisions concerning expropriation and compensation were inadequate; and that
there was no explicit guarantee for immaterial property rights. The court held that
there was no universal standard or formulationwith which s 25 had to comply.
8 The ﬁrst extensive consideration of s 25 by the Constitutional Court was in
2002, in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4)
SA 768 (CC), which is discussed below. Various provincial and local divisions of the
High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal have also considered s 25 in a number
of cases, which include: Joubert v Van Rensburg 2001 (1) SA 753 (W) (eventually heard
by the Constitutional Court in Mkangeli v Joubert 2001 (1) SA 1191 (CC)); Steinberg v
South Peninsula Municipality 2001 (4) SA1243 (SCA); Lebowa Mineral Trust Beneficiaries
Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (1) BCLR 23 (T); Transvaal
Agricultural Union v Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs & others 2003 4 SA411(LCC);
City of Cape Town v Rudolph & others 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C); Abrams v Allie NO &
others 2004 9 BCLR 914 (SCA); Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006
(1) SA 38 (SCA); Minister of Transport v Du Toit 2005 (1) SA 16 (SCA); Transnet Ltd v
Nyawuza & others 2006 (5) SA100 (D); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Gerber &
another 2007 (1) SA512 (W); City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd
2007 (1) SA 1 (SCA); Carmel Trading Company Limited v Commissioner for the South
African Revenue Service & others [2008] 2 All SA 125 (SCA). More recent Constitu-
tional Court decisions which involved an interpretation of s 25 are Mkontwana v
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett & others v Buffalo City Municipality;
Transfer Rights Action Campaign & others v Member of the Executive Council for Local
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The burgeoning body of case law, especially since 2002, shows that the
universally unavoidable task, regardless of the intricacies of any given case, is
to determine — and justify — the parameters of permissible legislative
interference with speciﬁc property rights. This general task encompassess
numerous, more speciﬁc, enquiries. It involves issues about: the exact
make-up of constitutionally acknowledged interferences with property;
which purposes would justify interference; what kind of interference should
give rise to compensation; and how compensation should be determined in
such cases. This array of legal questions will be referred to as the ‘interference
parameter issue’.
My premise is that the interference parameter issue connects intimately to
the relationship between existing private property interests and state pur-
poses. This relationship is reﬂected by the questions, frequently broached in
case law, about the kinds of duties attributed to the state in dealings with
private property and public interest, and the responsibilities befalling individ-
uals whose property rights are affected by state conduct. The balance
between private and public interests in matters of property protection and
regulation is neither novel, nor peculiar to the SouthAfrican setting. Recent
comparative scholarship9 demonstrates that issues around the responsibilities
of citizenship and the duties of the state are prevalent in at least the two
jurisdictions which are favoured comparators with regard to South African
constitutional property law. The question that arises is how these issues
inﬂuence decisions about the parameters of constitutional property protec-
tion and regulation. In what follows, the South African Constitutional
Court’s ﬁrst major attempt to engage with the interference parameter issue is
used to explain the point of departure in matters pertaining to constitutional
property protection and regulation. A comparative survey of German law
clariﬁes the meaning and importance of social contextual factors in the
interpretation of second (and third) generation property clauses, once the
relevance of the German example for SouthAfrica is established. Subsequent
South African Constitutional Court decisions are then discussed to reinforce
the argument about the importance of social/contextual factors in the
interpretation of a constitutional property clause. In the conclusion, the
German law example is referred to again to evaluate the trends emerging
from the SouthAfrican situation.
Government and Housing, Gauteng & others 2005 1 SA 530 (CC), discussed below;
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal
Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC), discussed below; Port Elizabeth
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC), discussed below; Du Toit v
Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC); Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecu-
tions 2006 (2) SACR 525 (CC); Monhuram & another v National Director of Public
Prosecutions and Another (Law Review Project as Amicus Curiae) 2007 4 SA 222 (CC);
and Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Gründlingh & others 2007 (6) SA350 (CC). The
lists are not exhaustive
9 Gregory Alexander The Global Debate Over Constitutional Property — Lessons for
American Takings Jurisprudence (2006).
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II THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE FNB DECISION
The 2002 Constitutional Court decision in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance10 (‘the FNB decision’) was the ﬁrst
major engagement with s 25. It still represents the most comprehensive
consideration to date of the structure and application of s 25 to particular
disputes. As such, it remains a useful point of departure, and a valuable
account of the framework for constitutional property protection and regula-
tion in South Africa. The decision solved some of the interpretative
difﬁculties with s 25, but raised new questions. It also challenged the
acceptance of the role of comparative law in the interpretation of the South
African constitutional property clause.
The case dealt with the constitutionality of a law permitting the conﬁsca-
tion, by the Revenue Service, of movable property (motor vehicles)
belonging to First National Bank, to settle the tax debt of some of the bank’s
debtors, who were purchasing the property by way of installments.11 In
applying s 25 to the matter, the court took its cue from an idea of which
different versions had long been supported in South African scholarship:12 it
conﬁrmed that the South African Constitution foresees a broad range of
limitations on property rights, generally designated as ‘deprivations’. Depri-
vations that give rise to compensation form a special ‘subcategory’within this
system.13 They are designated as ‘expropriations’. In terms of this under-
standing of s 25(1), read with the general limitations clause (s 36(1) of the
Constitution) all deprivations (also expropriations) must be undertaken by a
law of general application, may not be arbitrary, and must be reasonable and
justiﬁable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom. In addition, s 25(2) expressly requires expropriations to
be for a public purpose or in the public interest. Also, a constitutionally valid
expropriation invariably must give rise to the payment of compensation,
according to s 25(3).
10 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4)
SA768 (CC).
11 Section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. For more detail, see
André van der Walt ‘Negating Grotius — The constitutional validity of statutory
security rights in favour of the state: First National Bank t/a Wesbank v Commissioner of
the South African Revenue Service 2001 (7) BCLR 715 (C)’op cit note 6.
12 André van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause — A Comparative Analysis
of Section 25 of the South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 115; André van der Walt
Constitutional Property Clauses op cit note 4 at 335–6,André van derWalt Constitutional
Property Law op cit note 5 at 186–9; Roux ‘Property’ in Woolman et al (eds) Constitu-
tional Law of South Africa op cit note 6 at 46-29. Roux (updated by Davis) ‘Property’ in
Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights op cit note 6 at 20-19;
and KevinHopkins &KateHofmeyr op cit note 6 at 54.
13 FNB supra note 10 paras 59ff.
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This valuable contribution clariﬁes two core concepts within the constitu-
tional property inquiry.14 The court went further, using the s 25(1) prohibi-
tion against ‘arbitrary’ deprivations to develop a ﬂexible test by which to
determine whether ‘sufficient reason’ existed for an infringement upon
property rights.15 The court’s brief comparative survey16 conﬁrmed its
understanding of the non-arbitrariness requirement appearing in the depriva-
tions clause. According to the court, the ‘sufﬁcient reason’ test entailed the
consideration of various relationships. These include: the purpose of the
infringement in relation to the law effecting it; the purpose of the infringe-
ment in relation to the affected property or its owner; and the nature of the
affected property in relation to the extent and purpose of the deprivation.17
In explaining the ‘sufﬁcient reason’ test, the court outlined broadly the
purposes that would justify infringement of property rights. Where owner-
ship of land or corporeal movable items were affected by a restriction, the
purpose of the restriction would have to be more compelling than in the case
of less extensive property rights. Likewise, for an encompassing restriction
affecting all the incidents of ownership, there would have to be a more
compelling purpose than where only some of the incidents of ownership are
affected.18 The court stressed that ‘sufﬁcient reason’ would sometimes be
established by ‘no more than a mere rational relationship between means and
ends’, while in other cases a full-blown proportionality inquiry would be
necessary.19 In this particular case, the court found that the ‘net was cast far
too wide’.20 The provision was struck down for being unconstitutional.
Although the FNB case is not the ﬁnal word on the scope of permissible
interference with property, it is an important signpost. First, through its
identiﬁcation of the types of considerations that would determine ‘sufﬁcient
reason’ for an infringement,21 the court engaged with the complex relation-
ship between the individual and the state, and the various levels at which it
may be important.22 The court provided very general guidelines to deter-
mine whether a particular infringement is excessive. The ﬂexible ‘sufﬁcient
reason’ test was not designed to provide any clarity up front as to all possible
purposes that would or would not justify infringement. The court’s exposi-
tion even suggested that uncertainty will prevail, for the sake of ﬂexibility, in
14 See comments on the court’s contribution in eg Roux ‘Property’ inWoolman et
al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa op cit note 6 at 46–29 to 46–33; Hanri
Mostert ‘The distinction between deprivations and expropriations and the future of
the ‘‘doctrine’’of constructive expropriation in SouthAfrica’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 567.
15 FNB supra note 10 para 100ff.
16 The court covered ﬁve different jurisdictions between paras 71 and 99 of the
decision.
17 FNB supra note 10 para 100.
18 Ibid para 100(e)–(f).
19 For a more detailed analysis seeMostert op cit note 14.
20 FNB supra note 10 para 108.
21 See note 17 and its accompanying text.
22 FNB supra note 10 para 100ff.
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the young South African constitutional democracy. The instances where the
additional requirements for expropriation are not applicable will probably be
most problematic in future case law. In particular, the lack of a clear public
purposes requirement in s 25(1) renders it uncertain which state functions
would warrant permissible infringement not amounting to expropriation.
In the second place, the FNB decision suggested that the unique
circumstances of South Africa would determine how particular legal rules
should be understood, even if these originally had their roots in comparative
law. Nevertheless, the court’s analysis still acknowledged that comparative
law is important for constitutional property discourse. FNB used a compara-
tive inquiry to conﬁrm that uncompensable deprivation of private property
may be in the public interest.23 It also illustrates that the justiﬁcation for valid
infringement pivots on the relationship between ‘the sacriﬁce the individual
is asked to make and the public purpose this is intended to serve’.24 This latter
point has gained further importance in subsequent case law, even though
reliance on comparative law has waned, regrettably. In the following
sections, I illustrate how reference to comparative law can elucidate the
relationship between the individual, the public and the state in matters of
property.
III PROPERTY AND THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION IN GERMAN
LAW
Whereas one may turn to a number of jurisdictions for comparative
guidance, my focus here is the German system. Although the German and
South African societies nowadays are confronted with very different issues,
the perception that vast social differences between these systems may limit
the signiﬁcance of any legal comparative work, is mistaken. There are
important correlations between the two systems, which render comparison
suitable and valuable. South African property law is very similar to the
German system of property law, due to their shared roots in the Roman
property law tradition, and the inﬂuence of the German Pandectists on early
developments in South African property law.25 Major transitional events
marked the introduction of constitutions with justiciable bills of rights in
both systems: the end of the Second World War in 1945 for Germany, and
the end of apartheid in 1994 for South Africa. Further, both the South
African and German legal systems acknowledge the effect of their respective
23 Ibid para 97.
24 Ibid para 98.
25 André van der Walt ‘The South African law of ownership: A historical and
philosophical perspective’ (1992) 2 De Jure 454, with reference to the ﬁrst edition of
Cornie van der Merwe Sakereg (1979) that reﬂected the framework and content of the
Dutch Asser series, which was inﬂuenced by the Pandectist methodology and termi-
nology.
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constitutions on private law.26 German law was thus of particular interest in
the early days of comparative academic discourse on South African constitu-
tional property protection.
The German Basic Law is described as a second-generation (post-World
War II) constitution, and in this sense it is juxtaposed with the American
Constitution, which is a typical eighteenth-century, ﬁrst-generation,
classical-liberal constitutional document.27 Whereas the libertarianAmerican
Constitution deals with civil and political rights only, the German Basic Law
focuses on rights as well as duties, and is distinctly dignitarian.28 The German
Basic Law had a tremendous inﬂuence on the modern world, especially on
many of the countries whose constitutions were written after the Second
World War.29 In particular, German constitutional property law was one of
the fundamental examples relied upon in the drafting of the various versions
of the South African constitutional property clause prior to its enactment.30
South African interest in German law as a comparative agent dwindled after
the ﬁnal Constitution was enacted, partly because of practical problems of
access to sources, and partly because of politics. On the practical side,
problems such as the ‘language barrier’31 and the non-availability of German
literature in South Africa32 may be mentioned. Moreover, political factions
within the constitutional assembly that wanted to secure the strictest possible
protection of property for private individuals were hesitant to support a
model of strong property protection tempered by the possibility of state
interference with private property for the sake of the public interest, such as
that encountered in German law.33 For a while after the introduction of the
ﬁnal Constitution, comparative focus veered towards the Anglo-American
jurisdictions. Interest in German law is, however, on the increase again.34
26 Eg Van der Walt ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the development of
SouthAfrican property law (part II)’op cit note 6.
27 Alexander op cit note 9 at 11.
28 Ibid at 11–12.
29 Ibid at 12.
30 Jörg Fedtke Die Rezeption von Verfassungsrecht (2000) 329–33.
31 Matthew Chaskalson ‘The problem with property: Thoughts on the constitu-
tional protection of property in the United States and Commonwealth’ (1993) 9
SAJHR 388 envisaged the dominance ofAnglophonic jurisdictions as far as compara-
tive choices are concerned. However, the ‘language barrier’ argument holds true only
partially. The abstract and deductive reasoning processes of the continental legal fam-
ily continue to be attractive to SouthAfrican comparative lawyers. See John Murphy
‘Property rights and judicial restraint: A reply to Chaskalson’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 386;
Johan de Waal ‘A comparative analysis of the provisions of German origin in the
Interim Bill of Rights’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 1–2n1.
32 Van der Walt ‘Notes on the interpretation of the property clause in the new
constitution’op cit note 3 at 192ff.
33 See Fedtke op cit note 30 at 342.
34 See eg Van der Walt ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the development of
South African property law’ (part I) op cit note 6 at 1 and (part II) op cit note 26 at
26ff, where it is argued that German law has some relevance for the South African
judiciary’s recent focus on the state’s duty to protect fundamental rights.
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German constitutional property law certainly offers interesting insights as
regards problems such as those discussed here.
The South African Constitution, like the German Basic Law, is a modern
and transformative instrument.35 They are similar as regards the acknowl-
edgement of more than only civil and political rights. Being of the third
generation, however, the South African Constitution goes even further by
enumerating speciﬁc social and economic rights as positive constitutional
rights. As such, the South African Constitution is liberationist, rather than
libertarian.36 With this typiﬁcation, focus is placed on: adherence to
ideologies ranging from social-democratic to the democratic-socialist; some
degree of tolerance for an interventionist state, for the sake of equality; and
fair social distribution. Hence, socio-economic upliftment is a core goal of
the SouthAfrican Constitution.37
Despite their different contexts, the German and South African constitu-
tional property systems limit the constitutional right to property from the
outset. In both systems, an overriding obligation is imposed on property: it
must be socially useful. Both the German and SouthAfrican property clauses
textually afﬁrm that the constitutional right to property serves the needs of
their respective societies.38 Contrary to the American system of constitu-
tional property protection, the German and South African constitutional
paradigms already incorporate a textual acknowledgement that private rights
are subject to societal considerations.39 Conversely, a responsibility rests
upon private owners to exercise their rights in a way that promotes the
general public good. What remains is to establish the scope of such an
individual responsibility for promoting the public interest. This is where the
comparative insights from German law may be most helpful for the South
African setting.
The German system hence is a valuable comparative agent here, mainly
because of how it deals with the relationship between the individual and
society in deﬁning the parameters of permissible infringement on property
rights.40 The German judiciary’s focus on the state’s duty to protect
35 Van der Walt (part I) ibid, relying on Klaus Stern Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland III/1 (1988) 1553.
36 See Lourens du Plessis ‘The genesis of the chapter on fundamental rights in
SouthAfrica’s transitional constitution’ (1994) 9 SA Public Law 17; Lourens du Plessis
‘Drafting the chapter on fundamental rights’ in Bertus de Villiers Birth of a Constitution
(1994) 89 at 91–2; and the implications of this characterisation in Hanri Mostert op cit
note 2 at 295–330.
37 Du Plessis SA Public Law ibid at 3 and Du Plessis in De Villiers Birth of a Constitu-
tion ibid.
38 Alexander op cit note 9 at 7.
39 Ibid.
40 A preliminary assessment may be found in Hanri Mostert ‘The constitutional
state, the social state and the constitutional property clause — Observations on the
translation of German constitutional principles into south african law and their treat-
ment by the judiciary’ (2002) 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völker-
recht 347. See in general Ulrich Hösch Eigentum und Freiheit — Ein Beitrag zur
inhaltlichen Bestimmung der Gewährleistung des Eigentums durch Art. 14 Abs. 1 Satz 1
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fundamental rights is a particular point of interest, because it provides a
valuable counterpoint to the similar South African discourse. The inherent
dichotomy resulting from the political compromise incorporated in the
South African property clause — to regard the constitutional guarantee as a
tool for both protecting individual freedom and for initiating social change41
— renders evaluative comparison all the more important. German law
provides a helpful standard for such an exercise.
(a) The ‘basic right with several variables’
The German property clause, art 14 of the Grundgesetz (GG/‘Basic Law’),
endorses the institution of property and simultaneously acknowledges that
property rights are created and restricted by their speciﬁc social context.
Commentators do not agree about whether this dual commitment of
art 14 GG is inherently dichotomous42 or not.43 This commitment neverthe-
less is the backbone of the German courts’ interpretation of the property
guarantee, and accounts for the description of the German property clause as
‘the basic right with several variables’.44
In German law, the constitutional model of property that developed
during the twentieth century endorses the elementary idea that property
should beneﬁt its holders.45 This means that, constitutionally, the factual
ability of owners to use their property (Privatnützigkeit/Nutzungsbefugnis)
and their legal ability to dispose of it (Verfügungsbefugnis) are guaranteed,
alongside the constitutional entrenchment of the institution of property as
such (Bestandsgarantie).46 Accordingly, the institutional legitimacy of private
property is conﬁrmed and positive constitutional protection is envisaged.47
‘Property’ (Eigentum) is not deﬁned in the German property clause,48 but
art 14 I 1 GG is phrased in general terms, enabling an all-encompassing
GG, (2000); Jan-R Sieckmann Modelle des Eigentumsschutzes — Eine Untersuchung zur
Eigentumsgarantie des Art. 14 GG (1998); Jochen Rozek Die Unterscheidung von Eigen-
tumsbindung und Enteignung (1998).
41 Compare Frank Michelman ‘Mr Justice Brennan: A property teacher’s appre-
ciation’ (1980) 15 Harvard Civil Rights — Civil Liberties LR 304 as regards the Ameri-
can context.
42 Eg Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) op cit note 4 at 122;
Samuel Finer, Vernon Bogdanor & Bernard Rudden Comparing Constitutions (1995)
37–8.
43 Eg Gregory Alexander ‘Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The
German example’ (2003) 88 Cornell LR 733.
44 Bodo Pieroth & Bernard Schlink Grundrechte — Staatsrecht II (2006) 226–7 mar-
gin note 895.
45 Joachim Wieland ‘Artikel 14 [Eigentum, Erbrecht, Enteignung]’ in Horst
Dreier (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar 2 ed (2004) 1251margin note 29.
46 Ibid, and Pieroth & Schlink op cit note 44 at 226–7margin note 895.
47 Alexander op cit note 43 at 736.
48 Hans-Jürgen Papier ‘Art. 14’ in Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig GG Kommen-
tar (service issue 40, 2002) margin note 62. BVerfGE 36, 281 at 290–1; BVerfGE 42,
263 at 292–3; BVerfGE 51, 193 at 218; BVerfGE 58, 300 at 335–6.
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understanding of property in its constitutional sense.49 It is left to the
legislature expressly (in art 14 I 2 GG), and the judiciary by implication, to
determine which proprietary interests would qualify for constitutional
protection. As in South Africa, the lack of a constitutional deﬁnition of
property opens the system of constitutional protection to the dynamics in
German society, enabling the legislature and the judiciary to incorporate
changes in common perceptions into the law, while maintaining the Basic
Law as a guideline by which to measure such changes.50
(b) Property, self-realisation and the social obligation
The entrenchment of private rights is juxtaposed with the regulative ability
of the German legislature to determine the limits and contents of property
(gesetzgeberische Gestaltungsbefugnis/Inhalts- und Schrankenbestim-
mung).51 The regulative ability of the legislature (Gestaltungsbefugnis) is,
however, tempered by its duty to develop a social model which acknowl-
edges private property on the one hand (in art 14 I 1 GG), and which
supports socially responsible conduct with property on the other hand (in
art 14 II GG).52 This is the ‘social obligation’ (Sozialbindung) of property.
The regulatory leeway varies from case to case, depending on the social
relevance of the particular property interest at stake: disputes that arose from
German rent control law53 and land use control rules54 demonstrate that the
more socially relevant a particular property interest, the greater the legislative
scope to regulate such an interest.55 Simultaneously, case law demonstrates
that property tends to be protected in a fundamental sense, in so far as an
individual needs it to develop fully as a moral agent and a participating
member of the broader community.56 So, property is protected in Germany,
not to create a secure zone against the powerful and threatening state, but to
enable individuals to reach their full potential.57 Accordingly, the purpose of
49 Private property and productive property (Produktiveigentum); immovables
and movables; as well as small commercial enterprises and large corporations are
protected in terms of art 14 GG. Yet, the wide concept of property recognised for
purposes of article 14 GG does not simply include all rights or interests that have some
patrimonial value. Martin Thormann Abstufungen in der Sozialbindung des Eigentums
(1996) 63–75.
50 BVerfGE 20, 351 at 355; BVerfGE 24, 367 at 389; BVerfGE 25, 112 at 117–18;
BVerfGE 36, 281 at 290; BVerfGE 58, 300 at 335. All these decisions conﬁrm that
content and functions of property can and must be adapted to serve social and eco-
nomic conditions. The legislature should undertake such adaptation where necessary,
keeping inmind the fundamental constitutional and ethical values.
51 Wieland op cit note 45 at 1279margin note 74.
52 BVerfGE 25, 112 at 118; BVerfGE 52, 1 at 32–3.
53 BVerfGE 95, 64 at 84.
54 BVerfGE 101, 54 at 76–7.
55 Wieland op cit note 45 at 1287–8 margin note 89. Further also BVerfGE 50, 290
at 340–1.
56 BVerfGE 24, 367 at 389.
57 Alexander op cit note 43 at 748.
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constitutional property protection in Germany is ‘moral and civic’, rather
than economic. Conversely, the right of property implicates the values of
human dignity and self-realisation and is understood to follow the lines of
civic republicanism.58
A sophisticated system has developed in German law to help the courts
deal with the political undercurrents of the state’s regulatory powers
pertaining to property,59 deﬁne the ambit of interference with property,60
and determine (ﬁnancial and other) consequences of various kinds of
interference.61 To illustrate, the history of expropriation jurisprudence may
be mentioned. Under German law, the courts are specialised. Expropriation
issues nevertheless fall within the purview of both the administrative and civil
courts.62 This has resulted in different theories, developed by these courts,
about the distinction between expropriation and regulation (Inhalts- und
Schrankenbestimmungen) of property.
The Federal Supreme Court’s approach had the upper hand for some time.
It supported a broad notion of expropriation.63 The Federal Supreme Court’s
expropriation-oriented approach focused on the idea that expropriation
requires a sacrifice from the affected landowner that needs to be evened (ie the
so-called Aufopferungsgedanke).64 It applied a very formal criterion to
determine whether an infringement of property expected a special sacrifice65
from the owner, which went against the principles of equality. This became
known as the ‘doctrine of individual sacriﬁce’ (Sonderopfertheorie). It
introduced a relatively simple criterion — that of the unzumutbare Son-
deropfer (unacceptable, unreasonable and extraordinary sacriﬁce) — to
determine whether compensation for expropriation was necessary. The
problem was that the court’s application of this theory over time resulted in a
58 Ibid at 739.
59 Christoph Engel ‘Die soziale funktion des eigentums’ in Thomas Von Danwitz,
Otto Depenheuer & Christoph Engel Bericht zur Lage des Eigentums (2002) 25;
Wieland op cit note 45 at 1286–9 margin notes 86–91. See also the discussion of
transformative tendencies in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court
on article 14 by Markus Appel ‘Eigentumsgrundrechtlicher bestands- oder
rechtsstaatlicher Vertrauensschutz — was schützt den Eigentümer?’ (2005) Deutsches
Verwaltungsblatt 340.
60 Wieland op cit note 45 at 1289margin notes 86–91.
61 Uwe Kischel ‘Wann ist die InhaltsbestimmungAusgleichspﬂichtig?’ (2003) Juris-
tenzeitung 604.
62 The Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) has jurisdiction with regard to
the compensation that has to be paid for expropriations, whereas the Federal Admin-
istrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) has jurisdiction concerning the validity
of administrative decisions and actions pertaining to expropriation. The Federal Con-
stitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has jurisdiction with regard to the ques-
tion whether legislation, actions of the state or court decisions are in accordance with
the Basic Law.
63 Hartmut Maurer Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht 16 ed (2006) 705 (§ 27 margin
notes 15–16).
64 Ibid at 701–4 (§ 27margin notes 7–11).
65 BGHZ 6, 270 at 280.
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broadening of the notion of expropriation to the extent that the state’s
regulative capacity over private property was jeopardised.66
Other theories, developed in academic literature and in the administrative
courts, focused rather on the substantive delimitation of the concepts of
expropriation and deprivation/regulation of property.67 There is no scope
here for a detailed analysis. The ‘doctrine of intensity’ (Schweretheorie) of
the FederalAdministrative Court, for instance, entailed that the gravity of the
administrative measure directed against the property, together with the
weight of the burden placed upon the individual owner, would determine
whether the limits of the social function of property had been overstepped.68
This would dictate whether compensation was required.
The application of these different theories eventually resulted in the deeply
contested distinction between expropriatory infringements (enteignende
Eingriffe) and quasi-expropriatory infringements (enteignungsgleiche Ein-
griffe).69 This distinction pivots on the effects, legality and consequences of
any given administrative action.70 German lawyers regard this topic as a
potential quagmire of problems.71 For current purposes, it sufﬁces to note
that the introduction of these notions into the law confused the terminology
of constitutional property protection and state liability.72 It was argued that
66 Maurer op cit note 63 at 707–10 (§ 27margin notes 20–4).
67 These include, eg the Schutzwürdigkeitstheorie, Substanzminderungstheorie,
Zumutbarkeitstheorie, Privatnützigkeitstheorie and the Zweckentfremdungstheo-
rie.More detail may be found in ibid at 706 (§ 27margin note 17).
68 E g BVerwGE 5, 143 (145); BVerwGE 19, 94 (99). See ibid 706 ff (§ 27 margin
notes18ff). Otto Kimminich ‘Property Rights’ in Christian Starck (ed) Rights, Institu-
tions and Impact of International Law (1987) 87–8; Rudolf Dolzer Property and Environ-
ment: The Social Obligation Inherent in Ownership — A Study of the German Constitutional
Setting (1976) 25.
69 Maurer op cit note 63 at 707–10 (§ 27margin notes 20–4).
70 If such a measure directly and sufﬁciently intrudes upon an individual owner to
such an extent that she is expected to make a special sacriﬁce, an expropriatory
infringement (enteignende Eingriff) has occurred. BGHZ 92, 34 (41ff). This is an
atypical, unintended and unexpected side effect of a legitimate administrative action,
and gives rise to a claim for compensation. On the contrary, had the administrator
acted illegally or had it omitted to act where a legal duty existed, and had an infringe-
ment arisen as result of this action or omission, a quasi-expropriatory infringement
(enteignungsgleiche Eingriff) occurred. Friedrich Schoch ‘Die Haftung aus enteig-
nungsgleichem und enteignendemEingriff’1990 Jura 141.
71 See Fritz Ossenbühl Staatshaftungsrecht 5 ed (1998) p VI; Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke
‘Der Rechtsweg für die Geltendmachung vonAusgleichsansprüchen im Rahmen der
Sozialbindung des Eigentums’ 1995 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3151; Werner Thi-
eme ‘Über die Notwendigkeit einer Reform des allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts’
(1996) Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 763; Arnulf Schmitt-Kammler ‘Das ‘‘Sonderopfer’’
— ein lebender Leichnam im Staatshaftungsrecht’ 1990 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
2515; Jürgen Schwabe ‘Entschädigung für Naturschutzmaßahmen — BGH-Urt. V.
18.2.93 – III ZR 20/92 — BGHZ 121, 328’ 1994 Jura 529; Ulrich Hösch ‘Staatshaf-
tung undAufopferung’1999 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 192. The list is not exhaustive.
72 Friedrich Schoch ‘Die Haftungsinstitute des enteignungsgleichen und
enteignendemEingriffs im System des Staatshaftungsrechts’ (1989) Jura 534–6.
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this distinction amounted to a degradation of the basic right of property to an
aspect of state liability law.73
Then the Federal Constitutional Court introduced a ‘Copernican turn’ in
a series of cases74 of which the so-called Wet Gravel Extraction (Nass-
auskiesung) case75 was the most prominent.76 This legendary and oft-cited
case gave the Federal Constitutional Court the long-awaited opportunity to
design a truly constitutional conception of property and its delimitation. The
case entailed a complaint by an owner/operator of a gravel pit directed at
administrative action taken in terms of the Federal Water Resources Act
(Wasserhaushaltgesetz) of 1957. On the strength of this law, the relevant local
authority denied the owner of the gravel pit further permission to continue
extracting gravel from his land, because of the risk it entailed for the relevant
municipal water wells. The Constitutional Court found itself unable to
support the ruling of the Federal Court of Justice, which upheld the
complaint. Instead, the Constitutional Court used the case as an opportunity
to revise the earlier jurisprudence of the other branches of the German
judiciary, and to redeﬁne the scope of the expropriation mechanism.77 It
supported a strict distinction between regulatory deprivations and expropria-
tions of property,78 and a narrow conception of expropriation.79 In this way,
it put an end to the continual expansion of the notion of expropriation.80
The decision in the Nassauskiesung case resulted in the critical rethinking
of the notions of expropriatory and quasi-expropriatory infringements81 and
caused further reﬁnement of the idea of compensable regulatory infringe-
73 See further Fritz Ossenbühl ‘Enteignungsgleicher Eingriff im Wandel — BGH,
NJW 1987, 1945’ 1988 Juristische Schulung 193–6; Hans-Jürgen Papier ‘Enteig-
nungsgleiche und enteignende eingriffe nach der Nassauskiesung-Entscheidung —
BGHZ 90, 17 und BGH, NJW 1984, 1876’ 1985 Juristische Schulung 184–8; Arno
Scherzberg ‘Die Subsidiarität des ‘‘enteignungsgleichen Eingriffs’’ ’ 1991 Deutsches
Verwaltungsblatt 84.
74 BVerfGE 52, 1; BVerfGE 58, 137; BVerfGE 58, 300; BVerfGE 56, 249.
75 BVerfGE 58, 300.
76 Jochen Rozek Die Unterscheidung von Eigentumsbindung und Enteignung (1998)
8–10.
77 Friedrich Schoch ‘Rechtliche Konsequenzen der neuen Eigentumsdogmatik
für die Entschädigungsrechtsprechung des BGH’in Carsten Ebenroth, Dieter Hessel-
berger & Manfred Rinne (eds) Verantwortung und Gestaltung — Festschrift für Karlheinz
Boujong (1996) 660–1.
78 Maurer op cit note 63 at 715–6 (§ 27margin note 34).
79 The Constitutional Court progressively developed this narrow conception
of expropriation. See BVerfGE 24, 367 (394); BVerfGE 52, 1; BVerfGE 58, 137;
BVerfGE 58, 300 and beyond that BVerfGE 70, 191; BVerfGE 74, 264; BVerfGE 79,
174 and BVerfGE 83, 201. Rozek op cit note 76 at 19–81 presents a thorough analysis
of this progression.
80 Maurer (op cit note 63 at 707–10 (§ 27margin notes 20–4).
81 See inter alia Schoch in Ebenroth, Hesselberger & Rinne (eds) Verantwortung und
Gestaltung Festschrift für Karlheinz Boujong op cit note 77 at 655; Hösch op cit note 71
at 192–200.
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ments of property.82 Importantly, for current purposes, the decision illus-
trated the signiﬁcance of the ‘social obligation’ of property in matters dealing
with the distinction between regulation and expropriation. In this case, the
landowner was expected to sacriﬁce the proﬁtable use of his land, because of
the public interest in maintaining water supplies ﬁt for human consumption.
Subsequent case law followed suit. In more recent rulings regarding
constitutional property protection, the moral and civic dimensions of the
German constitutional property clause continues to provide guidance in
matters pertaining to the interference parameter with private property. The
distinction between regulation (Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung) and
expropriation (Enteignung) of property continues to enjoy particular judicial
attention, regardless of the speciﬁcs of recent cases.83 From among these, the
1999 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the Monument
Protection (Denkmalschutz) case84 may be highlighted. The case concerned
the fate of a villa, an architectural specimen from the Gründerzeit (ie founder
years). Such buildings enjoy a particular appreciation in Germany, because of
the grandeur of their neo-baroque style and because so many of them were
destroyed during the Second World War. They represent the entrepreneurial
spirit of the late 19th century, and the onset of an industrialised society in
Germany.
The particular villa was poorly situated, and had become so costly to
maintain that neither the owner nor the municipality of the area where the
building was situated could ﬁnd an economically sustainable personal,
commercial or other use for the villa.85 Since leaving the building to run to a
ruin was not an option, the owner applied for a demolition permit. Because
of the provisions of the Monument Protection Act of the Rhineland-
82 Maurer op cit note 63 at 716–17 (§ 27margin notes 35–6).
83 Federal Constitutional Court activity relating to constitutional property protec-
tion over the past decade dealt with (i) protection of cultural or natural heritage
(BVerfGE 100, 226; BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1998) 367; BVerfGE 102, 1);
(ii) extension of telecommunication services (BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
(2000) 798; BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2001) 2960; BVerfG, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (2003) 196); (iii) protection of shareholders’ rights (BVerfGE 100, 289;
BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2001) 279–81); change of land use
(BVerfGE 104, 1); (iv) taxation (BVerfGE 115, 97); (v) re-regulation of property in the
former DDR (inter alia BVerfG, Zeitschrift für Vermögens- und Immobilienrecht (2001)
111–14; BVerfG, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (2000) 792–3; BVerfG, Zeitschrift für
Vermögens- und Immobilienrecht (2001) 330–3; BVerfG, Zeitschrift für Vermögens- und
Immobilienrecht (1998) 101-103; BVerfGE 112, 1); (vi) rights of pre-emption (BVerfG,
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2000) 1486–7); (vii) various pension payments
(BVerfGE 100, 138–95; BVerfG, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (2007) 437–41).
See further BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-RR (2005) 454–6; BVerfG, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift (2005) 589–90; BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2002)
3460–1.
84 BVerfGE 100, 226.
85 Ibid at 229–30. The building had stood empty since 1981, when maintenance
costs were estimated at 300 000 DM per annum; and the renovation costs of the
building were estimated to amount tomore than onemillionDM.
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Palatinate, however, the relevant local heritage ofﬁce hesitantly refused the
owner’s application for a demolition permit.86 The refusal was subsequently
contested. In the course of these proceedings, the Federal Constitutional
Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of the Rhineland-
Palatinate’s Monument Protection Act, which determined that the authori-
ties consider the demands of the public interest in allowing a demolition
application, but had no similar provision for a consideration of the owners’
interests. It had to determine whether the Monument Protection Act was
unconstitutional for not allowing consideration of factors outweighing the
public interest in the protection of monuments.87
Two interesting, interlinked aspects of the Federal Constitutional Court’s
decision are relevant here. First, the court distinguished between the
regulation and expropriation of property, and found that the refusal to grant a
demolition permit in this case amounted to a legislative regulation of
property, and not to an expropriation.88 The court afﬁrmed that the
distinction between regulation and expropriation did not turn on the intensity
of an imposition on property. Instead, the intention behind such an imposi-
tion, as it appears from the relevant law, and the formal criteria stipulated in the
property clause for regulations and expropriations respectively, should be
decisive.
Secondly, the court rejected the idea that the contested and supposedly
one-sided provision for a consideration of public interests in general
burdened the owners of protected buildings disproportionately. It accepted
that the particular provision is necessary and appropriate in serving the
purpose of the provincial legislature to protect the German cultural heri-
tage.89 Considering the ‘social function’ of property, the court found that a
landowner could be expected to tolerate the fact that the full proﬁtability of
property cannot be exploited. The court reiterated that the legislative
capacity to regulate private property depends on the function of that property
in a particular setting. If it serves the personal freedom of the individual,
especially as concerns patrimonial interests, the legislature has less regulative
leeway. If the property has a distinct social function, serving society in
general, the legislative scope for regulation is much broader.90 However, in
86 Ibid at 230–1.
87 Ibid at 231–2. Considerations applying in the particular case, such as the fact that
building was no longer useful for anybody and that maintenance thereof rendered use
of the building uneconomic, could not be taken into account under the particular
provision of the Monument ProtectionAct. TheAct provides only for exceptions to
the protection of monuments where the public interest so requires.
88 Ibid at 239–41. The relevant legislative imposition limited in a general and
abstract way the use of land upon which monuments were situated. It was not
intended to withdraw the rights of a particular owner to fulﬁll a particular purpose.
The fact that the act had a particularly harsh effect in this speciﬁc case did not render
the provision expropriatory, rather than regulatory.
89 Ibid at 242.
90 Ibid at 241 and 242.
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this case there was no meaningful use whatsoever for the protected building,
and/or no solution that the owner could be expected to tolerate. A more
lenient take on the social function was accordingly appropriate.91
The Denkmalschutz case provides an example of how an otherwise
perfectly lawful and constitutionally justiﬁable provision for the regulation of
property could have particularly harsh consequences for an individual (a
so-called Härtefall). Whereas the unfortunate owner cannot be expected to
tolerate such an infringement, the exceptionally harsh effects of the regula-
tory action do not justify a ﬁnding of unconstitutionality. In these circum-
stances, the court indicated, it would be appropriate to consider the payment
of compensation as a means of ﬁnancially equalising the burden on the
individual owner, after other possible equalisation measures, such as transi-
tional arrangements, exceptions from the rule, and other possibilities have
been exhausted.92 The provisions of the Monument Protection Act were
eventually declared unconstitutional, but not because of the one-sidedness of
the considerations to be taken into account in considering demolition
permits. The Act was unconstitutional in that it did not deal appropriately
with the possibility of a disproportionate burdening of individuals: it did not
envisage that particularly harsh effects for individuals could be equalised by
allowing exceptions or providing for other administrative or technical
arrangements. Instead of striking down otherwise acceptable legislation, the
court gave the provincial legislature an opportunity to revise the act to insert
appropriate measures to cater for such individual instances of intolerable
severity.93
The Denkmalschutz and Nassauskiesung cases demonstrate how German
constitutional property law creates a hierarchy among resources94 by varying
the type of protection afforded, depending on the type of property involved
and the purposes served by the impositions thereupon.95 This continuum of
the social obligation96 is the secret to the successful balance between
ownership interests and the public good. The layered approach ensures an
effective distinction between limitations on ownership serving the social
obligation, and those that amount to expropriation.97 The social necessity of
a particular resource, alongside the degree of social interdependence associ-
ated with it, and the conditions of contemporary society, contribute to
determine its social ‘rank’, ie its position on the continuum.98 So, for
instance, greater legislative power is recognised over assets with an acknowl-
91 Ibid at 243.
92 Ibid at 245–6.
93 Ibid at 248.
94 Alexander op cit note 43 at 753.
95 German scholarship refers to this as the Abstufung der eigentumsrechtlichen
Grenzen (translation: ‘layering of the limits of property’). See Martin Thormann op
cit note 49 at 214–18.
96 Ibid.
97 Alexander op cit note 43 at 757.
98 Ibid at 764.
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edged social importance, than over property used for leisure.99 In this way,
German law distinguishes the economic functions of property from its
personal functions. It tends to provide stronger protection in cases where a
particular property interest is applied in a way which enhances or ensures personal
development or self-realisation of its holder.100 The Federal Constitutional Court’s
mantra in matters dealing with the function of the constitutional property
guarantee is ‘to secure a sphere of economic liberty’ (Freiheitsraum im
vermögensrechtlichen Bereich sicherzustellen) in which the owner ‘can lead
a self-responsible life’ (eine eigenverantwortliche Gestaltung des Lebens zu
ermöglichen).101
(c) Relevance of the German example
The German Basic Law set a trend in modern constitutional property law
through its express acknowledgement of the social function of property.102
The social obligation espoused by art 14 GG has become one of the main
vehicles for the realisation of the dual commitment to individual freedom
and social welfare. The point of departure is that ownership entails a special,
constitutionally entrenched duty towards the community in general: property
rights must be exercised responsibly, not to benefit only the individual owner, but also
the community at large. Beneﬁt to the individual and the community is
determined by the relevance of the property in achieving the goals of
personal self-realisation and/or the well-being of the community. Cases in
which the social obligation was invoked to support the public interest,
addressed a range of considerations from ensuring health or safety and
warding off public crises to situations where the modern life demanded
individual sacriﬁce for the sake of development, progress or the ideals of a
social-democratic state.103
These principles had a considerable inﬂuence on subsequent constitutional
developments elsewhere in the world, including SouthAfrica.104 Indeed, the
express commitment (in the preamble to the South African Constitution) to
the core value of social justice attests to the inﬂuence of the idea of social
99 Compare eg BVerfGE 50, 290 in which a legislative regulation of the relation-
ship between labourers and management in German industries was found to be a
constitutionally permissible social bind upon ownership, even though it reduced the
powers of shareholders in speciﬁc environments; and BVerfGE 52, 1 in which a law
severely restricting the abilities of owners to terminate small garden plot leases was
found to have become unconstitutional due to changing social circumstances.
100 See examples in Engel op cit note 59 at 59–70.
101 Inter alia in BVerfGE 24, 367 at 389; BVerfGE 52, 1 at 30; BVerfGE 83, 201
at 209; BVerfGE 89, 1 at 6; BVerfGE 100, 226 at 241; BVerfGE 101, 239 at 273;
BVerfGE 102, 1 at 15; BVerfGE, NJW-RR 2004, 1710–12; BVerfGE 104, 1 at 8;
BVerfGE 105, 252 at 277; BVerfGE 112, 93 at 107; BVerfGE 115, 97 at 110. The list is
not exhaustive.
102 Alexander op cit note 9 at 149.
103 BVerfGE 58, 300; BVerfGE 42, 193; BVerfGE 52, 1; BVerfGE 24, 367;
BVerfGE 50, 290; BVerfGE 89, 1.
104 Alexander op cit note 9 at 149.
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responsibility on South African constitutional law.105 Even more so, the
constitutional commitment to land reform demonstrates the impact of the
social-justice norm on property in particular. Adherence to principles such as
the rule of law and the social state in the South African Constitution mirrors
the idea of the social obligation as it appears in the German Basic Law.
The dual character of s 25 as a means to protect private property rights and
to promote social justice,106 and the inevitable interpretive tensions between
individual rights and social responsibilities107 further emphasise that, under
the South African Constitution, property does not have the same kind of
conceptual integrity and inviolacy as is thought to exist in conventional,
private-law thinking. Instead, the property guarantee is based on the
recognition that private property is limited by the exercise of state powers for
the public good. The constitutional paradigm thus already incorporates an
acknowledgement that private property rights are subject to societal consid-
erations or, conversely, that a responsibility rests upon private owners to
exercise their rights in a way that contributes to the general public good.
The challenge now is to establish the scope of the individual’s responsibil-
ity to promote the public interest. This in itself already justiﬁes the analysis
here, to understand how the South African law has developed. The rest of
this analysis identiﬁes how South African law continues to correspond with
German law as regards the core principle of the social responsibility of
ownership, despite the different socio-political contexts of the two jurisdic-
tions. The analysis below further indicates, however, that South African law
has begun to diverge in some respects from its original source of inspiration in
German constitutional law. The discussion ventures an explanation for this
development.
IV A SOUTH AFRICAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOCIAL
OBLIGATION
The FNB test of ‘sufﬁcient reason’ to assess the arbitrariness of particular
infringements already endorsed the idea that property protection can be
layered according to the social relevance of a particular interest. The court in
FNB distinguished between interests in land and other types of property, and
between singular aspects of ownership as opposed to an entire collection of
ownership entitlements. This was done to indicate that in some instances the
reasons for infringement would have to be ‘more compelling’ than in
others.108 The distinction hence anticipates the ranking of interests according
105 See a more thorough exposition of constitutional support for the social state in
Mostert op cit note 40 at 360–1.
106 FNB supra note 10 paras 50–2.
107 See, in general, the work of a major proponent of this view,André van derWalt,
much of which is listed in notes 3 to 6 above, and conﬁrmed in FNB ibid and Port
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers supra note 8 para 15.
108 FNB ibid para 100(f).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL256
to their social relevance in determining the validity of infringements upon
property.
The challenges in conceptualising the social obligation in South African
law, with its peculiar political baggage, are becoming clearer with the
proliferation of case law. The South African judiciary ever more frequently
has to ﬁnd solutions to sensitive legal problems with strong socio-political
dimensions. As is evident from some of the Constitutional Court decisions
after FNB, the recurring issue is the relation between existing private
property interests and state purposes.
Three subsequent decisions, all handed down within a six-month period
between 2005 and 2006, demonstrate speciﬁc parallels with the German
position as set out above. As with the German examples, each of the three
cases discussed below involved disputes between the state and private parties
as regards fundamental-rights claims, and in each the constitutional protec-
tion of property had to be considered either directly or indirectly. In each, an
inevitable question was the extent to which an individual can be expected to
contribute to promoting or meeting the state’s goals and/or obligations. In
this respect too, the chosen cases correspond with the German examples.
The cases diverge from the German examples in that they all involve (either
directly or indirectly) the phenomenon of unlawful occupation of land.
Unlawful occupation of land in South Africa is not criminalised. In fact,
legislative mechanisms protect unlawful occupants from severe eviction
practices,109 to avoid apartheid-style forced removals from land. The interests
of landowners invariably clash with those of the unlawful occupants. This
means that in disputes between the state and landowners, or the state and
unlawful occupants, there inevitably is a third dimension, in that the
opposing interests of two different private stakeholders must be weighed
against those of the public. The SouthAfrican examples are hence necessarily
rather more complicated than the German examples, which involved state
interference with ownership simpliciter. In addition, landlessness and home-
lessness (which is at the root of unlawful occupation of land) is a social
phenomenon that has been manipulated to gain access to government
housing. By invoking dire circumstances, unlawful occupiers sometimes
hope to get preferential treatment in the allocation of housing. This is
generally referred to as ‘queue-jumping’. The South African constitutional
provisions compel a search for case-speciﬁc solutions, with reference to all
relevant factors.110 The analysis below attempts to be brief, without losing
sight of the mentioned nuances.
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers111 dealt with the eviction of
unlawful occupants, in a context where the appellant state organ (the
Municipality) denied its alleged legal obligation to ﬁnd suitable alternative
109 In particular the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation
of LandAct (‘PIE’) 19 of 1998.
110 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers supra note 8 para 22.
111 Supra note 8 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PE Municipality’).
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accommodation for the evictees.112 The appeal was denied, with the effect
that the unlawful occupants could remain on the land. Essentially, the issue
relevant for current purposes was the manner in which the constitutional
right to property can be restricted by the applicability of other fundamental
rights, such as the right to housing espoused by s 26 of the Constitution.
The various cases joined for hearing in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett & others v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer
Rights Action Campaign & others v Member of the Executive Council for Local
Government and Housing, Gauteng & others113 all dealt with the question
whether state interference with individual owners’ ability to alienate their
land was permissible to promote the state’s ability to collect outstanding
debts. The disputes arose because of a number of laws114 establishing security
interests for the state (again on municipal level) regarding payment of water
and electricity charges. These laws embargoed the sale of land where such
charges were outstanding, hence placing the responsibility for ensuring
payment on the landowners,115 even where they did not incur the debts
because the land was occupied either unlawfully or by tenants.116 In some
instances the owners were not even aware that the debts were escalating117
due to the poor administrative practices of the municipalities involved.118
112 The occupiers were not enrolled for the municipality’s housing development
programme and could anyway not beneﬁt from it immediately, due to the waiting
period involved (para 55). They were prepared to vacate the premises if suitable
alternative accommodation could be provided, but did not want to relocate to the
area suggested by the municipality (Walmer) because they feared further eviction
(para 49), because of the upheaval this would cause for their school-going children,
and because of the longer commute to work. The municipality was not prepared to
consider two areas suggested by the occupiers, Fairview and Seaview, as options for
relocation (para 54).
113 Supra note 8 (hereafter cited as ‘Mkontwana’).
114 Section 118 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000; ss 49
and 50(1)(a) of the Gauteng Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939, which have
more or less the same effect.
115 In the one a quo decision, Geyser & another v Msundizi Municipality & others 2003
(5) SA 18 (N), the High Court of KwaZulu-Natal held that the provisions did not
result in arbitrary, unconstitutional deprivations of property. The South Eastern Cape
Local Division of the High Court, however, held in two instances (Mkontwana v
Nelson Mandela Municipality case no 1238/02 (unreported) and Bissett v Buffalo City
Municipality case no 903/02 (unreported) that an arbitrary deprivation was indeed
caused by the relevant provisions, which conﬂicted with s 25 of the Constitution.
116 In most of the cases joined for hearing, there were either tenants or unlawful
occupants on the property.
117 Mkontwana supra note 8 paras 18–21.
118 The municipalities were in a predicament because they were simply not able to
collect outstanding charges through other means. The debts were bad already, and the
ultimate municipal weapon — the disconnection of services — was ineffective
because services were simply reconnected unlawfully. Whether the predicament was
due to the lack of effort on the part of the municipalities, or to the lack of reasonable
and responsible conduct on the part of the owners, was something about which the
parties could not agree. Ibid para 22.
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The Constitutional Court found that the relevant legislation did not result in
arbitrary deprivations of property.119
The case of President of the RSA & another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd &
others,120 arose from the inability of the state to assist landowners in exercising
a legitimate eviction order121 to control the massive, incessant inﬂux of
unlawful occupiers onto their land.Avast informal settlement had established
itself by the time the matter came before the Constitutional Court.122 It had
to decide upon the kind of relief that the state was obliged to provide to the
landowners.123 The court ordered the payment of compensation to the
landowners.
Two preliminary comments about these cases are necessary. First, it is
necessary to comment on the centrality of the property clause for the
outcomes of these decisions. For Mkontwana, an FNB-style analysis and
application of s 25 was central to the court’s decision. While neither PE
Municipality nor Modderklip included outright analyses of s 25,124 they
nevertheless are important for an understanding of the interference parame-
ter of private property, because of the manner in which they deal with the
relation between property and other fundamental rights, such as housing.125
Secondly, the problems posed by each of these cases had serious implica-
tions for the public order. The housing need, homelessness and queue-
jumping were issues that arose in both PE Municipality and Modderklip.126 The
effectiveness of the sanctions available to the state was at stake in both
Modderklip and Mkontwana.127 All these cases reﬂected problems with social
transformation where the state is clearly incapable of providing basic means
to enforce rights. There are no parallels for these issues in the German
119 Ibid paras 31, 33ff.
120 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) supra note 8 para 34 (hereafter cited as ‘Modder-
klip’).
121 The order was obtained in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and
Unlawful Occupation of LandAct 19 of 1998, in the decision reported as Modderklip
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters 2001 (4) SA385 (W). Subsequent attempts to
have the order enforced went to the Supreme Court of Appeal, in Modderfontein
Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal
Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40
(SCA) (hereinafter cited as ‘Modderfontein Squatters’) para 9.
122 In the year that passed while the application for eviction was being heard, the
informal settlement of unlawful occupiers grew from an initial 400 people in 50
makeshift structures to almost 40 000 people in 6000 structures. The numbers kept
growing, even after the eviction order was granted. Modderfontein Squatters supra note
121 para 2.
123 Modderklip supra note 8 para 42.
124 Ibid para 29.
125 André van derWalt Constitutional Property Law op cit note 5 at 162.
126 Modderklip supra note 8 paras 13–15, 33–6. PE Municipality supra note 8 paras
3–5, 12, 55.
127 Modderfontein Squatters supra note 121 para 7, Mkontwana supra note 8 paras 22,
50–4.
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examples discussed above; yet the same kind of considerations upon which
the German decisions were based arose — quite independently — in the
SouthAfrican context. Most importantly, in all three cases the court engaged
with the duties and responsibilities of the state and the various private
stakeholders involved. It is noticeable that the court in each of these three
decisions adheres to a notion of individual duty towards the achievement of
state goals in ways very similar to the social obligation approach of the
German Constitutional Court. The term used in Mkontwana is ‘civic
responsibility’.128 I refer to this notion as ‘engaged citizenship’ where
appropriate.
(a) Civic responsibility (or: ‘engaged citizenship’)
In the Mkontwana case,129 as in the FNB case, the decision turned upon an
application of the ‘sufﬁcient reason’ test. However, in Mkontwana the test was
applied in a slightly adapted and less ﬂexible way:130 it was found that a
government purpose which is ‘legitimate’ and ‘compelling’would constitute
‘sufﬁcient reason’, and that it would have to be reasonable to expect an
individual to carry the burden of such a purpose in the particular case. Under
the particular circumstances of the Mkontwana case, the court (per Yacoob J)
decided that owners could reasonably be expected to bear the risk of unpaid
charges.131 The court explained its view as follows: Municipal services
beneﬁt the land, being an integral, value-enhancing aspect thereof.132
Because of this, landowners should remain responsible for consumption
charges, even where the service was delivered to non-owners, and even
where municipalities’ debt collection structures were patently deﬁcient.133
So, the bottom line is that owners must protect their property themselves and
ensure that its entitlements can be exercised.134 Essentially, this reasoning
arose from the court’s conﬁrmation that ownership does not entail only
rights, but also responsibilities, and its subsequent, heavy reliance on the idea
that private owners must be engaged citizens, ie that they must contribute
128 Mkontwana supra note 8 paras 38 and 52.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid paras 35ff. See the discussion of Van der Walt (2005) 122 SALJ op cit note 6
at 83ff.
131 Mkontwana supra note 8 para 51.
132 Ibid paras 40–3.
133 Ibid para 47. The court stressed that a municipality cannot simply ‘sit by and
allow consumption charges to escalate . . . in the knowledge that recovery will be
possible whenever the property falls to be transferred’ (ibid para 49). In further decid-
ing that it was not procedurally unfair that the contested legislation did not expressly
oblige municipalities to keep owners informed about outstanding debts, the court
also recognised that the duty to keep owners informed placed a burden on the
resources of and processes within the municipality (paras 65–7). Yet the court indi-
cated that non-performance of public duties, and lack of control over property
because of unlawful occupation could be remedied by private-law mechanisms, such
as delictual claims and eviction respectively (ibid para 62).
134 Ibid para 59.
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proactively to discharging the state’s duties. This is what the court dubbed
‘civic responsibility’:135 individual landowners are expected to shoulder the
burden of achieving some state goals or exercising of some state duties,
because they beneﬁt directly or indirectly from it through their property.
The Mkontwana decision was criticised for the manner in which it elevated a
dubious attempt to improve municipal debt management and collection
practices to a compelling public purpose, to be secured by an act of depriving
private individuals of their property.136
The PE Municipality decision (simultaneously)137 developed ideas about
the role and responsibilities of both the state (particularly local authorities)
and individuals in matters of eviction. Sachs J’s decision acknowledged that
the judiciary must manage the constitutional attempt to create a ‘caring
society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern’.138 This approach
reﬂects the idea of civic responsibility or engaged citizenship, and is
underscored by the court’s references to the communitarian philosophy of
ubuntu and the ‘need for human interdependence, respect and concern’.139
For those involved in issues of property protection and housing, this means
that they must avoid self-victimisation and be adaptable and resourceful in
ﬁnding ways out of their predicaments. They should look beyond the
stereotypes of social nuisance to recognise the dire needs created by poverty
and homelessness and do something about it!140 In matters of eviction, civic
responsibility hence requires sacriﬁce and proactiveness from both landown-
ers and occupants. On the one hand, landowners cannot simply rely on the
exclusivity and scope of their rights to demand removal of the social problem
caused by unlawful occupation.141 On the other hand, despite the strong
protection of ss 25 and 26 of the Constitution, people living in informal
settlements may yet lose their homes.142
The idea of ‘civic responsibility’ as developed in these decisions certainly
promises transformation-friendly solutions to property problems. It engages
private stakeholders, both landowners and other citizens, to become
involved in reaching objectives to be fulﬁlled by the new SouthAfrican state.
135 Ibid paras 38 and 52. In considering the purpose of the contested legislative
provisions, the court concluded that the provisions intend to secure payment of
services rendered as a matter of public duty by municipalities, thereby placing the cost
risk upon the owners. The court then remarked (para 38): ‘The purpose is important,
laudable and has the potential to encourage regular payments of consumption charges
and thereby to contribute to the effective discharge by municipalities of their consti-
tutionally mandated functions. It also has the potential to encourage owners of property to
discharge their civic responsibility by doing what they can to ensure that money payable to a
government organ for the delivery of service is timeously paid.’ (Emphasis supplied.)
136 Van derWalt (2005) 122 SALJ op cit note 6 at 84.
137 It was decided just a few days before Mkontwana supra note 8.
138 Ibid para 37.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid para 41.
141 Ibid para 20.
142 Ibid para 21.
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However, the outcome of Mkontwana suggests that civic responsibility or
engaged citizenship can also place patently unreasonable burdens on individ-
uals. This is demonstrated by the state’s argument in the Modderklip case, and
was addressed by the PE Municipality decision, which is discussed further
below.
(b) The state as ‘enabler’
In the Modderklip decision,143 the court had to deal with potentially disastrous
implications for the public order if the state was unable to enforce a legitimate
court order for eviction.144 The problem in this context was created by the
exponential growth of the informal settlement in the time it took to obtain
an eviction order. The dilemma was that, even if the eviction order could
have been executed, about 40 000 people would thereby be put out on the
streets, with nowhere to go, causing major social upheaval and exacerbating
homelessness.145 The unlawful occupation in this case was clearly not an
instance of malicious ‘queue-jumping’.146 Yet, if the court did nothing about
the unlawful conduct, public order and the supremacy of the law would be
jeopardised. Mere further conﬁrmation of the eviction order, or a simple
declaration of the rights of the owners, would obviously not have provided
effective relief. In fact, it would have frustrated the reformative goals of the
legislation in terms of which the original eviction order was granted.147 The
Constitutional Court thus had to consider whether the state was obliged to
provide relief to the landowners. It found that compensating the landowners
was an appropriate solution148 after considering the duties and responsibilities
of the state and private landowners respectively, in view of the state’s
land-reform goals and the problems created by landlessness.
The state raised an argument à la Mkontwana: the owners of Modderklip
brought their woes upon themselves by not taking effective steps to protect
their property at a point when the problem could still have been manage-
able.149 The Constitutional Court here acknowledged the duty of private
owners to protect their own property. The state’s argument was found to be
unconvincing, however, given the Modderklip owners’ ongoing, yet
futile,150 attempts to resolve their problem themselves, and the lack of
assistance (and in some instances even the lack of a basic response) from
143 Modderklip supra note 8 para 34.
144 There was a ﬂagrant and ongoing contempt of court, aggravated by the state’s
inability to deal with it effectively through criminal prosecution, because of the sheer
magnitude of the problem. The cost of enforcing the order, if outsourced to private
contractors, would far exceed the value of the land. Modderfontein Squatters supra note
121 paras 7, 10–11.
145 Modderklip supra note 8 paras 13, 34–6.
146 Ibid para 34.
147 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003
(6) BCLR 638 (T) 682.
148 Modderklip supra note 8 para 42.
149 Ibid para 27.
150 Ibid para 44.
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various organs of state.151 The aberrance of the state’s argument in this case
demonstrates that civic responsibility or engaged citizenship as a factor
inﬂuencing the interference parameter needs to be counterposed. It was
insightful of the court in Modderklip to recognise that in that case the state was
itself central to the solution of the problem. The court then considered how
the state is obliged to provide relief for the landowners.152
The idea of the state’s duty as enabler in the realisation of fundamental
rights indeed presents itself as a suitable counterpoint to engaged citizenship.
In fact, the court in PE Municipality had already engaged seriously with the
duties of the state in resolving the problems created by that municipality’s
attempt to evict unlawful occupants. It acknowledged the idea of civic
responsibility or engaged citizenship as described above, but stressed that the
state is obliged to ensure justice and equity in land use and enjoyment, under
conditions that are ‘socially stressful and potentially conﬂictual’.153 The state
must play an enabling role, in other words. Sachs J saw the state’s obligation
as one of mitigating, rather than intensifying, the marginalisation of the poor
and the homeless,154 to meet the demands of the Constitution. So, although
civic responsibility was endorsed unequivocally in PE Municipality, even more
was demanded from the state, especially in view of the duty to provide access
to housing. Where difﬁcult social problems are at stake, the state more than
ever must be both provider and mediator. It cannot pick sides or pit different
stakeholders against each other. In PE Municipality, the court refused to
endorse the granting of an eviction, because the municipality did not do enough
to ﬁnd a mediated solution, and did not attend to the genuine needs of the
unlawful occupiers.155
The Modderklip case clearly shows that passivity on the part of the state can
be catastrophic.156 The state’s dilemma here, of course, was that if it carried
out the eviction order, it would cause major social upheaval and misery;157
but if it failed to ensure the enforcement of the eviction order, it would
disrupt the public order.158 Either way, the rule of law would be compro-
mised.Avoiding an outright reliance on s 25 of the Constitution,159 the court
regarded the state’s conduct as unreasonable, because it forced private owners
to shoulder the burden of providing alternative housing for the unlawful
151 Ibid paras 8, 9, 13, 41ff and 48.
152 Ibid para 42.
153 PE Municipality supra note 8 para 18.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid para 59.
156 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika supra
note 147 at 683.
157 Modderklip supra note 8 paras 46–7.
158 It did not help, moreover, that the state was partially the architect of the prob-
lem: the Department of Land Affairs refused to accept the offer of the landowners to
sell the land to the state, whilst other organs of state ignored the landowners’ pleas for
assistance as the informal settlement expanded.
159 Modderklip supra note 8 para 29.
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occupants.160 It held that the state cannot simply ‘stand by and do noth-
ing’.161 Expecting the state to be an ‘enabler’ means that its obligations
cannot end with the provision of a legislative framework entailing mecha-
nisms to resolve disputes and the infrastructure to facilitate enforcement of
court orders.162 The state must ‘take reasonable steps . . . to ensure that
large-scale disruptions in the social fabric do not occur [to undermine] the
rule of law’.163 The state is constitutionally obliged to ensure progressive
realisation of the right to access to housing and land, even if its task is
immensely difﬁcult, resources scarce and competition intense among people
living in the bleakest conditions. Its passivity cannot be justiﬁed by the
(admittedly understandable) desire to discourage the homeless from trying to
jump the housing queue.164 Its actions cannot aggravate the victimisation of
the landowners affected by rampant and massive unlawful occupation.165
Eventually, the court in Modderklip found that a more serious attempt
could have been made to expropriate the occupied land, thereby alleviating
the Modderklip owners from bearing a burden patently befalling the state.166
The court ordered that the unlawful occupiers stay on the land, against
payment of compensation by the state to the landowners.167 The compensa-
tion seems to be intended as an equalisation payment.168 So, even though
s 25 was not central to the analysis of the problem in Modderklip, the court’s
approach still amounts to a ﬁnding that a limitation of landowners’ rights of
exclusion can be regarded as compelling and legitimate, ie a valid deprivation
of property. The high levels of tolerance expected from individuals affected
by curtailments of their property rights are set off against the eventuality of
compensation for their loss.
160 Ibid paras 49ff.
161 Ibid para 48.
162 Ibid paras 41 and 43.
163 Ibid para 43.
164 Ibid para 34 and 49.
165 Ibid para 44.
166 Ibid para 50, referring to s 34 of the Constitution.
167 Ibid para 68, conﬁrming the award made by the Supreme Court of Appeal;
Modderfontein Squatters supra note 121.
168 According to the court, this solution was feasible because it would make good
the violation of rights of the Modderklip owners, whilst simultaneously ensuring the
minimum disruption of the occupiers and relieving the state of the urgent task of
ﬁnding suitable alternatives (Modderklip ibid para 59). The compensation was to be
determined on the same basis as compensation for expropriation, with reference to
market value (para 65). The court did not comment on the supposed nature of such
compensation, but indicated that if the state decides to expropriate the land at a later
stage, the amount awarded was to be set off against the eventual expropriatory com-
pensation decided upon (para 65). The compensation order seems to be in the nature
of an order for ‘constitutional damages’. Such an award did not exist in common law,
and was not foreseen in the context of new land reform legislation, but is welcomed as
an act of transformative constitutionalism. See Van der Walt op cit note 26 at 29. See
also Van der Walt (2005) 21 SAJHR op cit note 6; Van der Walt Constitutional Property
Law op cit note 5 at 333.
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(c) Judicial ‘management’ of state duties and civic responsibility
The Port Elizabeth Municipality case169 conﬁrmed that the new, complex
function of the judiciary is to manage actively the achievement of full respect
for property rights,170 in the face of ‘diametrically opposed fundamental
interests’.171 Against the chequered South African past of dispossession and
denial of secure land rights,172 the judiciary must manage the balancing of the
conventional rights of ownership against the new, equally relevant right not
to be arbitrarily deprived of a home,173 without creating hierarchies of
privilege. The manner in which this is done, is to invoke both civic
responsibility and state duty in resolving disputes about property and
fundamental rights.
Considerations of state duty and civic responsibility inﬂuenced the
outcome of PE Municipality and Modderklip. In Mkontwana, however,
considerations of civic responsibility were strong enough to induce the court
to ignore the passivity (even the possible inefﬁciencies) of the state in
fulﬁlling its function of ﬁscal administration. In Modderklip, the passivity of
the state also aggravated the problem initially, as the court pointed out. Part
of what made the judgment against the state so convincing in Modderklip was
that the landowners acted in a ‘civilly responsible’ manner. In PE Municipal-
ity, the court unequivocally endorsed the idea of engaged citizenship or civic
responsibility in balancing competing interests, but it demanded even more
from the state, especially in view of the duty to provide access to housing.174
Acknowledging that it may sometimes be necessary to evict people from land
unlawfully occupied,175 the court refused to do so in the case of PE
Municipality, because the municipality did not try hard enough to ﬁnd a
mediated solution, and did not attend to the genuine needs of the occupi-
ers.176 Moreover, the owners themselves advanced no other productive
169 PE Municipality supra note 8.
170 Ibid paras 13, 36.
171 Ibid para 34, quoting Port Elizabeth Municipality v People’s Dialogue on Land and
Shelter & others 2000 (2) SA1074 (SE).
172 PE Municipality ibid para 15.
173 Ibid para 23.
174 Referring to its ground-breaking decision in respect to housing rights in Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom & others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC),
the court in PE Municipality ibid para 56 reiterated that municipalities are obliged to
improve access to housing systematically for all within their areas. It must be done
with an understanding for the complex socio-economic problems at the core of the
phenomenon of unlawful occupation of land, especially in urban areas. It further
required, however, of municipalities to embrace the complexity of their tasks: Not
only must a housing programme be in place that works in practice and responds to the
needs of the most desperate. The municipality must further also take into account the
speciﬁc needs of the particular occupiers and even must explore the potential of the
affected landowners tomake a contribution to the solution (paras 29, 31, 52–5).
175 PE Municipality ibid para 21.
176 Ibid para 59.
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purpose for, or use of, the land.177 As the guardian of the public interest, the
court stressed that ‘the greatest good for the many cannot be achieved at the
cost of intolerable hardship for the few, particularly if . . . such human distress
could be avoided’.178
The PE Municipality decision, in lieu of a speciﬁc analysis of the provisions
of s 25(1), advanced seminal ideas on the legitimacy and compelling nature of
certain state goals, and the impact thereof on the manner in which property is
restricted. It stressed that the imposition placed upon landownership by
anti-eviction measures is legitimate and compelling, even where their effect
is rather extreme. Yet the decision further indicated that tolerance of such
impositions is a proverbial two-way street, especially where more than one
set of private stakeholders are involved. In such cases especially, the state’s
involvement must be facilitative.
The PE Municipality decision is thus an important response to the
questions left open by FNB about how the parameters of permissible
infringement are to be identiﬁed and treated. If the FNB decision represents
the Constitutional Court’s attempt to resolve the structural issues emanating
from the constitutional property inquiry, the PE Municipality decision is its
counterpart in establishing the importance of social-contextual factors within
such an inquiry. Attempts at reconciling structural and social-contextual
considerations are made in both Mkontwana and Modderklip, but the results
vary to a large extent, and impact on attempts to deﬁne the interference
parameter of property. This suggests that the South African courts have only
just begun developing a model for the interplay between civic responsibility
and state duty. It renders the parallel model of the ‘social function’ of
ownership in Germany very interesting for comparative purposes.
V ASSESSMENT
The Constitutional Court decisions discussed here are but a cross-section of
the developing jurisprudence on state duty and civic responsibility in the
property context, but they are directional. They illustrate how difﬁcult it is to
abstract principles from precedent for subsequent re-application, especially
where legal questions have signiﬁcant socio-political dimensions. In South
Africa, like in Germany, there are many variables inﬂuencing the unresolved
issues about the interference parameter of private property. The interference
parameter is, for one, not determined by s 25 alone, but by its relation to other
constitutional provisions, such as s 26.179 Development of legal principles in
the particular context of s 25 hence cannot be separated from the broader
objective of general socio-political development of the new South African
177 Ibid para 52.
178 Ibid para 29. The court further condemned both queue-jumping and land-
grabbing and articulated the risk these phenomena pose for the provision of access to
housing (para 26).
179 The just administrative action clause of s 34 is another provision that may inﬂu-
ence the interpretation of s 25.
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society. Currently, the main problem that remains is to assess the speciﬁc
considerations of the public interest that will justify inroads on property, and
the extent to which such inroads could be permitted. The judiciary will have
to decide which interests should enjoy strong protection, and how much
protection is apt.
Progressively, the role that state duty and civic responsibility are playing in
the judicial resolution of such issues in South Africa is becoming clearer.
Although German constitutional law might have been the original source of
inspiration for importing the idea of the social obligation of ownership into
the SouthAfrican context, the idea of civic responsibility seems to have been
developed thus far without signiﬁcant reference to comparative law. Reasons
for the discontinuity were mentioned above. This does not mean, however,
that comparative law has nothing to offer for the further development of a
model of civic responsibility and state duty as regards the determination of
the interference parameter of property. On the contrary, it provides insight
into the kinds of purposes justifying infringement upon property, the scope
of such infringement and the manner in which this is determined by a
constitutional property inquiry. It also suggests possible consequences of
particular inroads on property.
(a) Purposes justifying infringement upon private property
German constitutional jurisprudence has acknowledged a quite extensive
range of state purposes justifying the regulation of private property to varying
extents. Among these are: (i) securing the quality of public water wells;180
(ii) public health and safety;181 (iii) provision of housing;182 (iv) dealing with
historical injustices and socio-political transition;183 (v) keeping pace with
changing social circumstances;184 and many more. The general tenor of these
decisions always is to assess whether such impositions would affect an
individual’s sphere of personal liberty and her ability to lead a self-responsible life,
while keeping in mind the public usefulness of specific types of property.185 The
more others evidently depend on the use of speciﬁc property, the greater the
state’s scope generally is to regulate such property.186 Where the effects of
such regulation are particularly severe for a speciﬁc individual, equalisation
measures are expected to be in place and to be employed.187
In South Africa, the FNB structure and its application in Mkontwana
demonstrates the need for ‘compelling and legitimate’ state purposes. Fiscal
efﬁciency was held to be such a state purpose in Mkontwana,188 but the
180 BVerfGE 58, 300.
181 BVerfGE 20, 351; BVerfGE 24, 367; BVerfGE 102, 1.
182 BVerfGE 95, 64; BVerfGE 89, 1.
183 BVerfGE 101, 239; BVerfGE 112, 93.
184 BVerfGE 52, 1; BVerfGE 101, 54; BVerfGE 105, 252.
185 Section III(b) above.
186 Alexander op cit note 9 at 135.
187 BVerfGE 100, 226 discussed in section III(b) above.
188 See section IV(a) above.
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decision was severely criticised for the dubious manner in which it elevated
deﬁciencies in the state’s debt management system to a public purpose, to be
remedied by depriving individuals of property rights.189 The relation
between FNB and Mkontwana show that even for a single state purpose —
that of the state’s ﬁscal efﬁciency — the application of the ‘sufﬁcient reason’
test may have different consequences.
By contrast, the purposes at stake in Modderklip and PE Municipality were
the eradication of homelessness alongside the duty to give effect to the
fundamental right to housing. PE Municipality conﬁrmed that the imposition
placed upon landownership by anti-eviction measures is legitimate and
compelling, even where their effect is rather extreme.190 Modderklip also
conﬁrmed that limitation of landowners’ rights of exclusion for this reason
can be legitimate and compelling, although Modderklip indicated signiﬁcantly
that landowners can be expected to tolerate this infringement, but not to carry
the risk of achievement thereof, as was the case in Mkontwana. The order
made by the court in Modderklip takes this into account, and attempts to
equalise the sacriﬁce of the Modderklip owners with an award for compensa-
tion.191 This approach corresponds with the equalisation rule in German law,
although the latter is more developed. From a comparative perspective, the
South African judiciary and legislature may want to note the various
possibilities that exist for equalisation of particularly severe individual cases as
they developed in German law. Developing this aspect in South African law
would be well in line with the emerging jurisprudence on engaged
citizenship and the enabling state.
(b) Scope of infringement
It is trite that ownership entails not only rights, but also responsibilities.192Yet
the examples from South African case law illustrate that the line between
what can be regarded as tolerable, and what cannot, is sometimes very ﬁne.
Occasionally it may simply be sufﬁcient to hold (as in the FNB decision) that
the legislature has ‘cast the net far too wide’ in attempting to protect the
public interest by impinging upon private property rights.193 In other
instances, as PE Municipality illustrates, a cocktail of social and political
considerations — such as neighbourliness and shared concern, resourceful-
ness against the odds, and state involvement, provision and mediation — is
required.194
Mkontwana (like FNB) turned upon the question of ‘how far’ the relevant
infringement went: a question that depended on how the interests of the
owners and the nature of the property affected are weighed against the public
189 Van derWalt (2005) 122 SALJ op cit note 6 at 84.
190 See section IV(b) above.
191 See note 168 above.
192 André van derWalt Property in the Margins (2006) 213.
193 See section II above.
194 See section IV(c) above.
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interest. The politics at the heart of this assessment — or conversely the
importance of a ‘pro-government’ decision — was not openly acknowl-
edged. By contrast, in both Modderklip and PE Municipality, the state’s duty to
deal with the problem of homelessness was decisive for the outcome of these
cases, even though the involvement of the affected landowners in ﬁnding a
solution to the problem also received attention. Both Modderklip and PE
Municipality expressly recognised pressing social realities such as poverty and
‘intense competition for scarce resources’ in ﬁnding that passivity on the part
of the state cannot be tolerated in matters of housing. In view of this aspect of
Modderklip and PE Municipality, it is surprising that state passivity was
overlooked in Mkontwana, and private individuals were expected to bear the
risk where the purpose of ﬁscal efﬁciency was at stake.
The German model of the social function of property as a sliding-scale has,
in that setting, subsumed much of the difﬁculty in determining the scope of
infringements. The fact that the German judiciary is open about the core
purpose of constitutional property protection,195 namely to secure individual
liberty to facilitate responsible self-governance, permits it to assess the extent
to which that value is jeopardised by a particular imposition. In this way, the
German model of property protection fosters engaged citizenship. The core
purpose of constitutional property protection in South Africa appears from
the PE Municipality decision: the aim to create a society based on ‘neighbour-
liness and shared concern’; the acknowledgement of the public interest in
protecting both existing property relations and new need-based interests in
land; and the court’s aversion to passivity on the part of any of the players in
ﬁnding context-sensitive solutions. However, in Mkontwana the jeopardy to
this core purpose was not considered as openly as it was in Modderklip. This
suggests that further judicial development and endorsement of the notion of
engaged citizenship and the enabling state is necessary to entrench the idea in
SouthAfrican jurisprudence.
(c) Effect on the structure of the constitutional property inquiry
On a structural level, reliance on civic responsibility and state duty may open
up possibilities that were eliminated by what Roux has dubbed the
‘artibrariness vortex’ created by the FNB structure of inquiry.196 In brief, the
195 Alexander op cit note 9 at 139.
196 The SouthAfrican judiciary seems to prefer a ‘two-stage’approach to an inquiry
concerning the constitutional (in)validity of statutes (S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA391
(CC) paras 100–2). The FNB decision particularised the two-stage inquiry for appli-
cation to s 25 speciﬁcally. In terms of its approach, the starting point is to consider
s 25(1), ie whether the conduct complained of is arbitrary. If it is, the second step is to
determine whether the conduct is justiﬁable under s 36(1). If it is (or if the conduct
was found not to be arbitrary to begin with), the next step is to assess whether the
conduct amounts to an expropriation as envisaged by s 25(2) and (3). If the conduct
passes the scrutiny of s 25(2) and (3), it is constitutionally legitimate and permissible. If
not, it could be justiﬁed by another application of s 36(1). If this is impossible, the
conduct is unconstitutional. See Roux ‘Property’ in Woolman et al (eds) Constitu-
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structure of the constitutional property inquiry resulted in a contraction of
two core questions: ﬁrst, whether the infringement complained of affected
property; and secondly, whether there was any mentionable infringement at
all.197 As Roux prophesied,198 even this contracted question often receives
no more than passing notice, because courts tend to assume that the property
rights at stake do warrant constitutional protection and are indeed curtailed by
disputed actions of the state. This complicates the South African constitu-
tional property inquiry unnecessarily, since ﬁndings are then generally made
upon considerations of proportionality and justiﬁability of infringements, of
which arbitrariness becomes a main determinant. A potential mechanism
with which to ‘ﬁlter out’ some matters at an early stage of the inquiry is
thereby severely reduced, if not eliminated.199 Moreover, because FNB and
Mkontwana made it evident that even for a single state purpose (ie that of
ﬁscal efﬁciency)200 the application of the test to determine arbitrariness may
have different consequences, it seems that the structure of the constitutional
property inquiry is prone to manipulation. These pitfalls of the ﬂexible
arbitrariness standard, demonstrated further by a comparison of Mkontwana
and PE Municipality,201 suggest that there is a need for further development of
a theory of the interplay between state duty and civic responsibility in the
notion of engaged citizenship and the enabling state.
Both Mkontwana and Modderklip suggest that an actual acknowledgment
that rights had been curtailed seems to be much more important than has
been assumed up to now. Up to now, such an approach had not enjoyed
much scholarly consideration, and even less support. Even so, these decisions
respond to the difﬁculties of a structure that essentially requires ﬁndings to be
based upon rationality or proportionality of interference. Though it may
inform these aspects of an inquiry too, reliance on civic responsibility and
state duty could additionally pave the way for a doctrine in terms of which
the social function of property assumes that some types of interference with
property does not even warrant a more intensive level of scrutiny. This
approach has been applied in Germany quite successfully.202
tional Law of South Africa op cit note 6 at 46–2 to 46–5. What is noticeable within this
structure is that it is assumed: (a) that the conduct affects an interest, which is classiﬁ-
able as property; and (b) that the conduct amounts to an interference with such an
interest.
197 Van derWalt Constitutional Property Law op cit note 5 at 53ff.
198 Roux ‘Property’ in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa op cit
note 6 at 46-19ff.
199 Ibid at 46-20.
200 See sectionV(a) above.
201 See section IV(a) above.
202 Wolff Heintschel Von Heinegg & Ulrich Haltern ‘KeineAngst vorArt. 14 GG!’
1993) Juristische Schulung — Zeitschrift für Studium und Ausbildung 123. Further details
in Hanri Mostert The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence
on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany — A
Comparative Analysis (2002) 99ff.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL270
(d) Consequences of particular inroads on property
What is also necessary is more clarity on the results of particular inroads on
property, especially taking into account the FNB legacy. FNB left very little
room for an argument that the violation of property rights under the
deprivations clause may give rise to compensation.After the FNB decision, it
was assumed that the judiciary would not recognise such an ‘intermediate’
category of impositions (‘constructive expropriation’).203 These are typically
necessary exercises of the state’s regulatory powers, which detrimentally
affect individual owners rather than whole classes of owners. For such
impositions, some kind of ﬁnancial reward or damages may be justiﬁable
because of the sacriﬁce they entice from individual owners. However, if the
FNB reasoning is applied, such (excessive) exercises of regulatory power are
constitutionally not permissible, because they ‘cast the net far too wide’.204
This approach provides one solution to the question of how the particu-
larly harsh effects of a regulation of property on an affected owner should be
treated. However, it does not deal effectively with the issue of the acceptable,
even desirable, regulation that has a particularly harsh effect for a single
individual. Modderklip dealt with this issue by foreseeing monetary compen-
sation for violation of the rights guaranteed by the deprivations clause. The
nature of this compensation (ie damages, equalisation, or some kind of
reward similar to expropriatory compensation) was not clariﬁed.205Although
the decision contextualised the homelessness problem in relation to the state’s
constitutional duty to do what is possible, within its limited resource
capacity, to eradicate the problem, it still is a far cry from the thoroughly
developed idea of equalisation measures that have emerged from the German
Constitutional Court, particularly in the wake of the Monument Protection
case.206
(e) Concluding remarks
If a viable model for determining the interference parameter of property is to
be found, there can be no denial of the state’s goals, and the politics behind
them. These are to be juxtaposed with the core intent of constitutional
property protection. Within this context, more conﬁdence needs to be
placed in the potential of supposedly ‘soft’ considerations such as civic
responsibility or engaged citizenship in shaping the structure of constitu-
tional property protection in South Africa. It can have a very real impact on
the technical aspects of the law.
The German example of ranking interests according to their social
function illustrates this well. There, interests that enjoy strong protection are
those reafﬁrming a right holder’s status as an engaged citizen (in the sense of
203 Roux ‘Property’ in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa op cit
note 6 at 46-32;Mostert op cit note 14 at 592.
204 See note 20 above.
205 See note 168 above.
206 See section III(b) above.
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being a moral or political agent), rather than those that serve exclusively
economic interests such as wealth maximisation.207 The layering of resources
and/or interests according to their social importance greatly aids decisions
about the extent to which interferences upon particular property interests are
permissible and should be tolerated, and the purposes justifying such
interferences.
So, in the South African context, considerations of state duty and civic
responsibility in the curtailment of individual property rights for the public
good certainly are present, but an abstraction thereof is underdeveloped. At a
doctrinal level, these need to be considered more thoroughly. To do so, the
transitional context within which South African constitutional law functions
must of course be acknowledged. Also, it must be accepted that property
does not denote only rights of ownership in the narrow conventional
private-law sense, but includes also a broader range of entitlements and
interests. Moreover, this notion of property needs to develop not so much
along rights-based lines, but instead towards a more serious awareness of the
responsibilities underlying property rights. The South African Constitution
endorses, much like that of Germany, that owners must be tolerant of inroads
upon their rights, for the sake of the broader public good. In fact, even more
is required by the South African judiciary: owners and other right holders
must be both proactive and resourceful in ﬁnding solutions to property problems
with signiﬁcant socio-political dimensions. They must behave like engaged
citizens.
But this responsibility on private owners by no means implies that the state
may abdicate its own duties in creating a society based on the values of
democracy, freedom, social justice and the rule of law. A heightened
awareness of the duties inherent in private ownership brings with it an
increased demand on the state to be involved, facilitative, mediating, in fact
instrumental, in resolving the tensions between the public interest and private
rights.208 The state is under pressure to become an enabler.
It would have been easier to generalise about how far civic responsibility
could be stretched, and the extent to which state duty counterposes
individual involvement in the resolution of property measures, if there were
more clarity as to the kinds of state purposes that would justify severe inroads
on private rights. As demonstrated above, in German law there already are a
host of examples of state purposes that over time have justiﬁed even severe
inroads on private property. The South African examples deal at present
mainly with the solution of the homelessness problem and with the state’s
ﬁscal efﬁciency. As concerns homelessness, the South African courts tend to
require strong intervention from the state, even if a good measure of civic
responsibility is demanded — both from landowners and unlawful occupants
207 Alexander op cit note 43 at 739; cf Engel op cit note 59 at 70–6 and 95.
208 It has been illustrated convincingly by Van der Walt op cit note 34 at 655 and op
cit note 26 at 1, for instance, that the ‘doctrine’of state duty has overridden the debate
about horizontal applicability of fundamental rights.
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— to make solutions work. As regards the state’s ability to manage debt
effectively, there seems to be less of a trend, and less expectations upon the
state.
What deﬁnitely is noticeable, though, is the impatience of the South
African Constitutional Court with any form of passivity, be it on the part of
the state or the private statkeholders involved in property disputes. In
Modderklip, PE Municipality and Mkontwana — despite their different issues
and outcomes — the Constitutional Court criticised attitudes smacking of an
unwillingness on the part of all interested parties to get involved and to be
resourceful in tackling problems related to property. This gives an idea about
the outcome of future decisions about the interference parameter.
To conclude, it is appropriate to remark on the most fundamental insight
gained from revisiting the original link between the South African and
German constitutional property contexts. This relates to the notion of
‘engaged citizenship’ as explained above: the transformative South African
context displays promising potential to develop the idea espoused in German
constitutional property law that property entails rights as well as responsibili-
ties. The South African judiciary appears willing to go even further than
requiring individual self-governance (in the sense of eigenverantwortliche
Gestaltung des Lebens).209 PE Municipality indicates that the Constitutional
Court requires self-restraint from owners in the exercise of interests that are
not conducive to the public good. But the contestable Mkontwana ruling
suggests that even more is required: self-denial for the sake of the public
interest.
This illustrates the curious comparative dimension involved. The compar-
ison involved two jurisdictions that demonstrate similarities in the nature of
the law applicable to the issue of the interference parameter of property, but
which are dissimilar as regards the mechanics (the structure and process) of the
applicable rules. Yet, the considerations determining interpretation of the
applicable legal rules are strikingly similar, despite the very different socio-
political contexts in which these interpretative exercises are undertaken. Only
the intensity of the application differs. For this reason, it may be very useful to
continue consulting German law, if the notion of engaged citizenship and the
enabling state is to be cultivated more concertedly in SouthAfrica.
209 See note 100 above.
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